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[No declarations on human rights, nor even any conventions or laws protecting human
rights, are suffiient for their purpose unless we recognize, as a personal responsibility,
respect in word and deed for the dignity of the human being. 1
The successful operation of international extradition agreements re-
quires good faith and fairness from sovereign states in their dealings
with one another. Fraud in the performance of treaty obligations dero-
gates the underlying norms of international public order. If sovereign
states are to trust one another in discharging their mutual obligations
under any treaty, some body of imperative norms-the violation of
which is actionable by the victimized sovereign-is necessary. However,
while international extradition treaties impose reciprocal obligations on
sovereign states, remedies for the violation of these assumed norms are
deficient. This comment highlights the potential for abuse of interna-
tional extradition agreements through fraud and the injustice resulting
from the lack of adequate remedies for such abuse.
The vehicle for this discussion is the case of Leonard Peltier.2 Peltier,
an American Indian, was extradited from Canada to the United States
to face trial on two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of two
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the Pine Ridge Reserva-
* B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author, a member
of Tigar & Buffone, P.C., is in private practice in Washington, D.C. He is counsel to Leonard
Peltier.
1. D. Hammarskj6ld, Statement of the Human Rights Day Concert (Dec. 10, 1960), in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1960-61, at 296 (A. Cord-
ier & W. Foote eds. 1975).
2. This commentary does not explore the historical context of the Peltier prosecution. For
this, I recommend P. MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE (1980); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, PROPOSAL FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT OF DOMES-
TIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON CRIMINAL TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
34-55 (1981); J. MESSERSCHMIDT, THE TRIAL OF LEONARD PELTIER (1983).
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tion, South Dakota in 1975. This comment sketches the processing and
resolution in Canadian and American courts of Peltier's objections to his
extradition. Some observations about the law of international extradi-
tion and the obligations imposed on nations in seeking and rendering
fugitives follow. Finally, the comment concludes with a call for reopen-
ing the Peltier case and for the development of an appropriate remedy
to correct and deter future abuses and bad faith in the extradition
process.
I. The Procedural Development of United States v. Peltier
Leonard Peltier was a prominent leader of the American Indian
Movement (AIM), an organization dedicated "to encourage self-deter-
mination among American Indians and to establish international recog-
nition of American Indian treaty rights."'3 In early 1975, at the request
of tribal elders, he and other AIM members went to the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation in South Dakota to alleviate conflict between those
members of the reservation who supported the tribal form of govern-
ment and those who supported AIM.4 Several of the AIM supporters
stayed in a tent area known as "Tent City" near the Harry Jumping
Bull Compound, a small group of houses close to Oglala, South Dakota.
These supporters later testified at Peltier's trial that they feared an as-
sault by Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers and some of the reserva-
tion residents, who they said were known to harass and assault AIM
members. 5
On June 26, 1975, two FBI agents and one American Indian, Joe
Stuntz, were killed in a shootout that erupted near the Compound. A
day earlier, the two FBI agents, Jack Coler and Ronald Williams, had
gone to the Compound with two BIA agents to look for James Eagle,
who was wanted for assault and theft. After being informed that Eagle
had not been seen for several days, they left. Coler and Williams re-
turned the next day. The two FBI agents followed a vehicle into the
Compound. When the vehicle stopped at a fork in the road near Tent
City, the FBI agents stopped at the bottom of a hill. Shooting began.
The agents were seriously wounded by shots fired at a distance, and
then they were killed with a high-velocity, small caliber weapon fired at
close range. Four American Indians-Leonard Peltier, Darrelle Butler,
Robert Robideau, and James Eagle-were later charged with the
3. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssocIATIONS 1166 (18th ed. 1983).
4. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 318-20 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945
(1979).






The compound was quickly surrounded by law enforcement officials,
but those at the compound escaped. The FBI suspected that Peltier was
involved. Apparently, Peltier and others then fled to the Rosebud In-
dian Reservation in South Dakota. This group then split up with, at
least three other AIM members-Robideau, Norman Charles, and
Michael Anderson-fleeing south.
Peltier eventually fled to Canada where he was arrested on February
6, 1976. Pursuant to treaty, 7 and the enabling Canadian statute,8 the
United States requested extradition for five felonies: a 1972 attempted
murder of an off-duty police officer in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; an at-
tempted murder of an Oregon state trooper in November, 1975; the bur-
glary of a home in Oregon around the same time as the Oregon
attempted murder; and the murders of the two FBI agents. The extradi-
tion hearing was assigned to Mr. Justice William A. Schultz, who was a
justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court. The Canadian Depart-
ment of Justice assigned one of its attorneys to represent the United
States.
On June 18, 1976, the Canadian tribunal ruled that Peltier be extra-
dited for all of the offenses except the Oregon attempted murder
charge.9 In granting the United States extradition request for the
deaths of the two FBI agents, Mr. Justice Schultz quoted extensively
from two affidavits executed by an alleged witness named Myrtle Poor
Bear. In those affidavits, Poor Bear stated that she was Peltier's girl-
friend and had gone with him to the Jumping Bull Compound in June,
1975. She stated that she knew Peltier planned to murder FBI or BIA
agents and that he had planned an escape route. After the FBI agents
had been wounded from a distance, Poor Bear said, Peltier approached
the agents as they attempted to surrender and executed them at close
range with a rifle. She claimed that she had pounded on his back in an
attempt to stop him. In August 1975, according to Poor Bear's state-
6. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945
(1979).
7. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Canada, Dec. 3,
1971, United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237.
8. Extradition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-21 (1970).
9. In re Extradition Act, Leonard Peltier, No. 760176, reasons for judgment at 86-87
(Vancouver: June 18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Peltier Extradition]. Under the doctrine of
specialty, a person may be tried only for those crimes for which he or she was specifically
extradited. See ithfa text accompanying notes 32-34. Extradition proceedings are like "prob-
able cause" proceedings in that the standard for determining extradition is "whether or not
there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict
of guilty." Peltier Extradition at 25.
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ment in the affidavits, Peltier discussed the killings with her. 10
Mr. Justice Schultz's decision was based almost exclusively on the
Poor Bear affidavits.'1 He briefly referred to a pathologist's report
which tended to corroborate Poor Bear's account of how the agents were
killed. However, this standing alone did not implicate Peltier in the
murders. 12
Meanwhile, Butler and Robideau had been apprehended and their
trial begun in the United States. Since the government designated Poor
Bear as a potential witness, the defense obtained in discovery a third
Poor Bear affidavit (chronologically the first), dated February 19, 1976.
This affidavit stated that Poor Bear knew of Peltier's plans to kill the
agents and to plot an escape route and that she had met Peltier at Rose-
bud where he confessed the slaying to her. Contrary to the subsequent
affidavits, however, the February 19 affidavit stated that Poor Bear had
left the Jumping Bull Compound before the shooting occurred.13 The
government did not call Poor Bear as a witness. Butler and Robideau
were later acquitted.'
4
Still in Canada, Peltier sought review. He first sought review by the
Federal Court of Appeal of Canada. He presented the February 19
Poor Bear affidavit and argued that, in light of it, the Poor Bear affida-
vits relied upon by Mr. Justice Schultz could not be believed. The ap-
pellate court, however, declined to reverse the lower court or to reopen
the proceedings. 15 Peltier then sought review by the Canadian Minister
of Justice on the basis that he was being extradited for a political of-
10. Affidavits by Myrtle Poor Bear (Feb. 23, 1976 & Mar. 31, 1976), reprinted in Peti-
tioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 43a-48a, Peltier v. United States, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
11. Peltier Extradition at 8-10. After quoting the Poor Bear affidavits, Justice Schultz
noted, "There is, in addition, circumstantial evidence, comprising other affidavits of Ex. 18,
relating to each of the two alleged murders, which it is unnecessary to relate." Id at 10.
12. See id The United States submitted the report of an FBI firearms expert that indi-
cated that a shell casing found at the scene by an FBI agent had been expelled from a high-
velocity rifle. The report suggested that a damaged rifle which was found in an exploded car
driven by Robideau, Charles, and Anderson (and which was linked to Peltier) fired the cas-
ing. See generally P. MATTHIESSEN, supra note 1, at 282.
13. Affidavit by Myrtle Poor Bear (Feb. 19, 1976), reprintedih Petitioner's Brief for Writ of
Certiorari at 43a, Peltier v. United States, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
14. United States v. Robideau & Butler, Cr. 76-11 (N.D. Iowa July 16, 1976).
15. Peltier v. United States of America, Federal Court of Appeal, Canada, No. A-441-76
(Vancouver Oct. 27, 1976) (unreported judgment). At the time of Peltier's extradition, judi-
cial review of the decision of the extradition judge could be sought before the Federal Court
of Appeal, Canada, but the examination of the sufficiency of the requesting state's evidence
was limited. See Federal Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 28 (2d Supp. 1970). A peti-
tion for habeas corpus may be taken to a provincial superior court. However, in most cases,
habeas corpus may only test the jurisdiction of the extradition judge. Re Commonwealth of
Virgihia and Cohen (No. 2), 14 C.C.C.2d 174 (Ont. H. Ct. 1973). See generally G. LAFOREST,
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA 118-32 (2d ed. 1977). The Canadian system is cogently
criticized in Morrison, Extradition from Canada- Rights of the Fugitive Following Committal for Sur-
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fense. 16 The Minister refused relief on either political offense grounds or
the use of the Poor Bear affidavits. On December 16, 1976, Peltier was
transferred from Vancouver, British Columbia to Rapid City, South
Dakota. The trial commenced in April, 1977 in Fargo, North Dakota.
At trial, the prosecution did not call Poor Bear. When the defense
lawyers questioned her outside of court, she recanted her earlier affida-
vits. The defense then called her as a witness to establish that the gov-
ernment had manufactured false evidence to buttress a weak case.' 7 The
trial judge allowed the defense to question Poor Bear in a proffer, but
excused the jury. Poor Bear stated that she had never seen Peltier
before the trial and that she had never lived in the Jumping Bull Com-
pound. She explained that two FBI agents spent a considerable amount
of time with her in February and March of 1976, and that the agents
obtained the affidavits by threatening her with arrest, physical harm,
and even death to herself and members of her family. According to her
testimony, the agents took her to the Jumping Bull area at least twice
and showed her a model of the scene in order to add credibility to the
affidavits. Further, she testified that the affidavits were untrue, that she
had never read them, and that she had signed them only under coercion
and not in the presence of a notary."' Based on his opinion of Poor
Bear's unreliability, the trial judge found that her testimony was imma-
terial and that any relevance it did have was outweighed by the danger
of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. At the same time, the
trial court found that if Poor Bear's testimony were true, it would
"shock the conscience of the Court and in the interests of justice should
render, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 366 (1976). Recent developments in the law concerning judicial review
of the extradition judge's decision are discussed at 61 CAN. B. REV. 519 (1983).
Since the time of the Peltier extradition hearing, Canada has entrenched in its Constitution
guarantees of civil liberties. See Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) ch. 11; CAN. CONST., Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, §§ 1-34. It is not clear what effect, if any, the provisions of
the Charter may have in the circumstances stated here.
16. This is a recognized defense in extradition proceedings. When nations sign bilateral
extradition treaties, they typically reserve, by treaty provision or specific domestic statutory
law, the right of the executive of the asylum state to refuse to surrender a fugitive if the
offense charged is of a political nature. Thus, a nation's head of state or its delegate may
discharge a prisoner whose extradition is sought notwithstanding any order of a judge. See,
e.g., Extradition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-21, § 21 (1970). The United States has reserved
the same power. See 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1982).
17. This is similar to proof which is often offered by prosecutors against criminal defend-
ants. A prosecutor is extremely likely to present a witness who can state that the accused
attempted to coerce a false alibi story from the witness (whether or not it was successful) and
most judges would admit the evidence. See The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 241-42 (1817)
(Story, J.); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 273
(2d ed. 1972); Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Impliedftom Spoliaion, 45 YALE L.J. 226 (1935).
18. Record at 4584-4665, United States v. Peltier, Cr. No. C77-3003 (D.N.D. June 1,
1977).
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be considered by the jury."' 9 The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and
Peltier was sentenced to two consecutive life terms.
2 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 2'
The defense contended that the judgment should be reversed because
the evidence presented to the Canadian tribunal "consisted of the false
affidavits of Myrtle Poor Bear, obtained by the government through co-
ercion and deceit and known by the government to be false."' 22 Peltier's
illegal extradition for the murder charges, according to the defense's the-
ory, deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. The attorney for the United
States stated at oral argument that his own examination of the submit-
ted Poor Bear affidavits led him to the conclusion that they were false.
He conceded that use of them in the Canadian proceedings was im-
proper.2 3 Counsel contended, however, that under the Ker-Frisbie 24 doc-
trine the jurisdiction of a trial court is not affected by the manner in
19. Id at 4707-08.
20. Other evidence presented at the Canadian extradition proceeding also appeared at
trial to be misleading. An FBI agent who had sworn in the extradition proceeding that he
had found the shell casing used in the ballistics tests stated that his earlier affidavit was incor-
rect. He explained that the casing had been found by another FBI agent. The latter agent
confirmed this testimony. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1978),cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979).
The government's other evidence is summarized in the circuit court opinion. Id at 319-20.
Most of the government's evidence was circumstantial. A substantial portion of the trial
record consists of the government's proofof"other crimes." The trial court allowed the prose-
cution to introduce evidence regarding the Milwaukee and Oregon incidents as relevant to
motive and flight. A critical part of the government's case was the testimony of three wit-
nesses-Wilford Draper, Michael Anderson, and Norman Brown-who placed Peltier in the
vicinity of the agents' car near the time of the shooting. Record at 788, 1037-38, 1445-46,
Peltier. All three witnesses were young American Indians who testified that they had been
threatened, intimidated, or physically abused by FBI agents during the investigation. Id. at
841-44, 1083-89, 1097-1101, 4801-12. Defense witness Gene Day testified that the FBI agents
threatened to take her children from her if she did not cooperate. Id. at 3553. The court of
appeals later discounted this testimony, pointing out that all three of the witnesses stated that
the testimony they gave at trial was the truth as they remembered it. Pe/tier, 585 F.2d at 329.
21. The defense had five grounds of appeal: (1) that evidence introduced at trial was so
prejudicial and inflammatory that its admission constituted a denial of due process; (2) that
the trial court refused to instruct the jury on Peltier's defense that he was a victim of an FBI
frame-up and that it refused to allow him to introduce much of the available evidence of FBI
misconduct; (3) that the trial court's refusal to reread testimony requested by the jury consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion; (4) that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try him because the
United States Government deliberately violated the extradition treaty between the United
States and Canada; and (5) that the prosecution is barred by the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 320 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. den ed, 440 U.S. 945
(1979). The focus in this article is on the fourth.
22. 585 F.2d at 335 (quoting defendant's contention).
23. The following exchange occurred between Judge Ross and the attorney for the
United States at oral argument before the Eighth Circuit panel:
MR. HULTMAN: It was clear to me [Poor Bear's] story didn't later check out
with anything in the record by any other witness in any other way . . . . [S]he was
incompetent in the utter, utter, utter ultimate sense of incompetency . . . . [Once] I had
a chance to look at [Poor Bear's statements] and tested them with all of the record [and]
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which the defendant's presence was obtained. While the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the defense that the use of the affidavits "was, to say the
least, a clear abuse of the investigative process by the F.B.I.,"'25 the court
found it unnecessary "to decide what standard should be applied to the
review of claims of government misconduct in international extradition
proceedings . . . ." It held that Peltier's claim was, "on its face, lacking
in substance." The court stated that it was convinced from its review of
the trial transcript that other substantial evidence of Peltier's involve-
ment in the murders was presented to the Canadian authorities, but the
record of those proceedings had not been made available to the trial
court or the circuit court.
26 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
27
II. Toward a Remedy for Abuses of International Extradition Proceedings
The reluctance of the court of appeals to examine the fraud before the
Canadian tribunal in this case is an unfortunate outgrowth of the
Supreme Court's Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 28 The doctrine, essentially a form
of abstention, holds that jurisdiction over an accused obtained through
forceable abduction does not defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court.
all of the witnesses, there was not one scintilla that showed Myrtle Poor Bear was there,
knew anything, did anything ....
JUDGE ROSS: But can't you see, Mr. Hultman, what happened happened in such
a way that it gives some credence to the claim of the-
MR. HULTMAN: I understand, yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE ROSS: -the Indian people that the United States is willing to resort to any
tactic in order to bring somebody back to the United States from Canada.
MR. HULTMAN: Judge-
JUDGE ROSS: And if they are willing to do that, they must be willing to fabricate
other evidence. And it's no wonder that they are unhappy and disbelieve the things that
happened in our courts when things like this happen.
MR. HULTMAN: Judge Ross, I in no way do anything but agree with you totally.
JUDGE ROSS: And you try to explain how they get there is not legally relevant in
the case, and they don't understand that.
MR. HULTMAN: I understand, Your Honor.
JUDGE ROSS: We have an obligation to them, not only to treat them fairly, but
not give the appearance of manufacturing evidence by interrogating incompetent
witnesses.
United States v. Peltier, No. 77-1487 (8th Cir. 1978) (transcript of oral argument), reprinted in
Petitioner's Brief for Writ of Certiorari at 50a-51a, Peltier v. United States, 440 U.S. 945
(1979).
24. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
25. 585 F.2d at 335 n.18. A Canadian court later termed the American action in sup-
pressing the original Poor Bear affidavit "unusual and reprehensible." Halprin v. Sun Pub-
lishing Co. [1978] 4 W.W.R. 685, 689 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
26. 585 F.2d at 335.
27. Peltier v. United States, 440 U.S. 945 (1979). While these appeals were pending, the
Oregon burglary charges were dropped and Peltier was acquitted of the attempted murder in
Wisconsin. State v. Peltier, No. 2122C (Or. Cir. Ct., Malheur County Sept. 7, 1977); State v.
Peltier, No. 7676 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County Jan. 27, 1978). Charges against James
Eagle, the fourth person indicted, were later dropped.
28. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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Scholars of international law have argued not only that Ker-Frisbie has
no place in a modern world regulated by treaty, but also that it is not
authorized by any credible view of international law.29  American
courts, however, have insisted upon mechanical application of the doc-
trine with little critical examination.3 0 Ker-Frsbze is simply recited in
support of the proposition that extradition treaties are for the benefit of
the sovereigns concerned, not for the people whose liberty is affected.
3'
According to the doctrine of specialty, an accused may be prosecuted
by the requesting state only for an offense upon which the extradition
was based. This principle inhibits misrepresentation among nations and
promises study of each charge as a potential political offense. An exam-
ple of the application of specialty is United States v. Rauscher.3 2 In Rau-
scher, the defendant's presence was obtained ostensibly in order that he
might be tried for murder. He was then tried for a different offense.
The Court granted an order in arrest of the judgment because it found
the government's action to be a "fraud upon the rights of the party ex-
tradited and . . . bad faith to the country which permitted his extradi-
tion."' 33 Later decisions have held that specialty is a privilege of the
asylum state, "designed to protect its dignity and interests," and not a
personal right of the accused. 34 As a result of this limitation and Ker-
Frisbie, American courts have placed the burden of complaining on the
29. The most lucid and informed discussion is contained in Garcia-Mora, CriminalJursdic-
tion of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Countiy by Force or Fraud- A Comparative Study, 32
IND. L.J. 427 (1957).
30. If an accused is extradited to the Second Circuit, he or she may be able to show a
violation of due process if it can be proved that the United States authorities acquiesced in
submitting the accused to brutality or torture. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974). This exception is very narrow and does not condemn kidnapping unless the con-
duct "shock[s] the conscience" of the court. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d
62, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant ar-
rested in Panama by U.S. undercover agent and subjected to poor jail conditions:
"[E]xtradition treaties are made for the benefit of the governments concerned .... [i]t is the
contracting foreign government, not the defendant, that would have the right to complain
.... "); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975) (Argentinian
kidnapped in Bolivia: "[I]t is plainly the offended states which must in the first instance
determine whether a violation of sovereignty occurred .... ") United States v. Reed, 639
F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (American citizen kidnapped from Bimini: "[Aibsent protest or
objection by the offended sovereign, [the defendant] has no standing to raise violations of
international law as an issue."); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 1983)
("[I]t is not suggested that Italy has asserted any violation of its rights of sovereignty.").
32. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
33. Id. at 422. See also Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907) (United States unsuccess-
fully sought extradition of fugitive from Canada for an alleged offense not covered by treaty.
United States reindicted for a covered offense, obtained extradition, dismissed the charge and
incarcerated the accused for the original sentence); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899)
(defendant arrested while free on bail, after extradition, for charge based on conduct before
extradition).
34. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
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nation from which the accused was extradited. This comment submits
that Canada has a domestic as well as an international obligation to
redress the defrauding of its judicial institutions by another sovereign.
A. Possible Responses by the Asylum State to Illegal Extradtion
If sovereign nations are to trust one another in carrying out their
treaty obligations, there must be an obligation of fair dealing, good faith
and truthfulness imposed on every contracting state making sworn rep-
resentations in the tribunals of another sovereign. Admittedly, extradi-
tion treaties generally contain no explicit requirement that a requesting
state be truthful in the presentation of evidence to the judicial body of
the requested state.35 However, implicit in any workable contract be-
tween nations in which they agree to submit evidence in support of
probable cause to the courts of either state must be an understanding
that the parties will not defraud one another. This understanding pro-
vides the necessary foundation for international relations. 36 It is beyond
the scope of this comment to identify the most appropriate label for such
generally accepted principles as truth-telling in international practice.
Whether fraud in the execution of treaty obligations is barred by the
fundamentals of natural law, international public policy, imperative
norms, customary law, morality, or the requirement of public order is
immaterial. No school of thought on the subject would argue that mis-
representation should be allowed to go uncorrected. 37 The nations of
the world have a vital obligation not only to one another to preserve the
international rule of law against illegal usurpation by another state but
also to their own citizenry to redress fraud which taints their judicial
institutions.
This analysis leads to an exploration of the appropriate remedy in the
Peltier case. It is conceivable that Canada has jurisdiction to prosecute
the subornation of Poor Bear's perjury,38 an extraditable offense under
35. However, there are at least some minimum requirements of reliability. The Extradi-
tion Act of Canada, for example, provides that affidavit evidence must at least contain formal
indicia of authenticity. See CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-21, §§ 16-17 (1970).
36. "For good faith, in the language of Cicero, is not only the principle hold by which all
governments are bound together, but is the key-stone by which the larger society of nations is
united. Destroy this, says Aristotle, and you destroy the intercourse of mankind." H. GRO-
TIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 417 (M. Walter Dunne 1901).
37. Seegeneratv G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1974). Although imper-
ative norms of international law are generally discussed in consideration of the hypothesis
that some treaties may be facially void in the international community regardless of the in-
tent of the contracting parties, some analysts have specifically recognized that the same body
of imperative norms cannot be violated in the execution of treaty obligations. See Law of
Treaties, 3d Report by G.G. Fitzmaurice, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/l 15, reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 26 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1958) Add. 1 p. 26.
38. See, e.g., Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983) (bail bondsman and bounty
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the treaty.39 However, this would scarcely purge the taint on the extra-
dition proceeding and would still permit the United States to benefit
from its fraud.
There is a more complete and appropriate remedy. Since the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine places the burden of complaint on the requested state,
Canada should demand Peltier's return so that the extradition proceed-
ing can be relitigated. This remedy, applied in similar circumstances
when the findings of a tribunal rested on facts ultimately proven to be
wrong, is supported by three principles: first, a party should not be per-
mitted to retain the benefit of its own fraud; 40 second, relitigation is the
only means of assuring and maintaining the integrity of the administra-
tion ofjustice;4 t and third, the falsehood casts doubt upon the weight of
all of the other evidence adduced at a proceeding. 42 If Canada fails to
act in situations like the one presented here, American application of
Ker-Frisbz'e provides no review for extraditions obtained via
misrepresentation.
Upon a new extradition hearing, the United States could offer any
credible evidence it has in support of a probable cause finding. How-
ever, since the jurisdiction of the American trial court was based on the
illegally obtained extradition, the Canadian courts should not view
hunter who captured a fugitive in Canada and returned him to the United States against his
will can be extradited to Canada to face Canadian kidnapping charges).
39. Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Canada, Dec. 3, 1971, United
States-Canada, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 983, 986, T.I.A.S. No. 8237.
40. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (acknowledging that a conviction based
upon the presentation of testimony known to be perjured is a violation of the due process
clause, but declining to grant habeas corpus relief on procedural grounds); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959) (granting habeas corpus relief where the prosecutor failed to correct a
false denial by a government witness that he received no promise of consideration for his
testimony, even though the falsity went only to the credibility of the witness).
41. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956)
(remanding with directions to allow additional evidence before the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board; appellants alleged new evidence showing that witnesses relied upon by the Board
had perjured themselves in similar proceedings. "The untainted administration of justice is
certainly one of the most cherished aspects of our institutions." Id at 124.); Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (Smith Act conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial
because of new evidence that a government witness lied; the court stated that federal courts
have a responsibility "to see that the waters of justice are not polluted." Id at 14.); United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1974) (prosecutor learned of perjury before a
grand jury prior to attachment of jeopardy; the court held that the prosecutor was obliged to
inform the court, dismiss the charges, and seek a new indictment "to correct the cancer of
justice that had become apparent." Id at 785.).
42. When there has been attempted subornation, coercion of a witness, or spoliation of
evidence, "the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in human experience," and "the infer-
ence is an indefinite one, that the whole cause must be an unfounded one since such means
are employed to sustain it." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 278, 277, at 133 (Chadbourn rev.
1979). American juries are sometimes invited to draw a related inference with regard to a
witness through submission of thefalsus in unofalsus in omnibus instruction. 2 E. DEVIlT & C.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 73.04 (3d ed. 1977).
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Peltier's conviction as binding on their independent judgment. Instead,
they should consider the evidence presented by the United States in
light of the entire course of the proceedings against Peltier. As part of
the re-extradition process, the Canadian Minister of Justice would also
reconsider Peltier's application for the political offense exception.
4 3
Even if Canada decided to extradite Peltier, a rehearing would deter
future abuses of extradition proceedings and would promote greater re-
spect for individual rights in the execution of international agreements.
Canada and the United States are both familiar with this remedy in
practice. In 1891, the United States successfully demanded that Spain
return a fugitive wrongfully taken from the United States by Spanish
authorities, without prejudice to Spain's treaty right to commence
proper extradition proceedings. In another instance, the British govern-
ment returned to the United States a Canadian citizen who had been
taken from the State of New York and sentenced to a reformatory in
Canada. In 1909, Canada returned a fugitive to the United States who
had been abducted from a border area in North Dakota.44 Similarly,
Canada should not hesitate to invoke the re-extradition remedy and de-
mand Peltier's return.
B. Possible International Procedures to Ensure Good Faith in International
Extradition Requests
Even if Canada is unwilling to discharge its international and domes-
tic obligation to remedy the fraud upon its own judicial institutions,
other nations of the world are not relieved of their general obligation
43. Before a fugitive is surrendered, the Minister of Justice routinely considers any appli-
cation for the political offense exception. See G. LAFOREST, Supra note 15, at 132. The evolu-
tion of Canadian and English extradition law on the political offense exception is complex
and lies beyond the scope of this brief comment. See general y id. at 61-77; Castel & Edwardh,
Political Ofnses: Extradition and Deportation-Recent Canadian Development, 13 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 89 (1975). An excellent discussion of the various categories of political offenses which
have been recognized is contained in Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Politcal Offenses: A Knotty
Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962). England has traditionally taken a
broad view of the political offense exception. See, e.g., In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (extra-
dition denied where accused was charged with killing a member of the Swiss government
during a forceable possession of a municipal building in the course of a political insurrection).
44. Excerpts from these and similar proceedings are reprinted in 4 G. HACKWORTH, DI-
GEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 345, at 224-28 (1942) and 4 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW § 603, at 328-32 (1906). Although demands are generally honored when it is
clear that the rights of the demanding state have been violated, there is no uniformity in the
course of these decisions or the analysis upon which the decisions are made. Consistent with
the practice in American courts of noting that sovereigns may complain of extradition treaty
violations, the United Nations recognized this right of a sovereign when it condemned Israel
for kidnapping Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi war criminal, from Argentina. 15 U.N. SCOR
(138th Mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev. 1 (1960).
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beyond the interests of Canada, the United States, and Peltier, to pro-
mote the international rule of law.
Article Thirteen of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that an alien lawfully in a territory may be expelled pursu-
ant only to a "decision reached in accordance with law."' 45 An extradi-
tion resulting from a decision based on a misrepresentation before the
requested state's courts violates the spirit-if not the letter-of Article
Thirteen.
Since these provisions are largely hortatory and not an enforceable
code, scholars and jurists repeatedly have emphasized the need for ar-
ticulated remedies to avoid abuses in international extradition proceed-
ings. Luis Kutner has proposed and drafted a world habeas corpus
treaty-statute of the International Court of Habeas Corpus by which
accepted principles of human rights could be enforced. 46 Both Justice
Brennan47 and Justice Douglas48 have strongly supported Kutner's In-
ternational Court of Habeas Corpus as a means of enforcing interna-
tional due process.
The advantages of such a remedy include not only ensuring compli-
ance with treaty obligations and promoting the rule of law among na-
tions, but also protecting the individual defendant from abuse in
international proceedings. 49 The need for adoption of an international
forum to preside over domestic judicial institutions is particularly com-
pelling when, as here, the courts of each sovereign defer to the other and
both decline to inquire into the conduct of extraterritorial proceedings.
Indeed, should Canada and the United States each fail to examine the
record and to explore bilateral remedies, a higher forum is required.
The proliferation over the last forty years of international treaties,
conferences, conventions and resolutions has been founded upon a belief
45. G.A. Res. 2200A, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 170, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 170
(1966). Cf G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948) (Article Nine of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states that "[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary . ..exile," while
Article Ten states, "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of
any criminal charge against him.").
46. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525, 541-550
(1964) (the proposed treaty-statute sets forth the procedure, competence and structure of the
court). See also Bassiouni, International Extradition.- A Summary of the Contemporary Amencan Prac-
tice anda Proposed Formula , 15 WAYNE L. REv. 733, 760-61 (1969).
47. Brennan, International Due Process and The Law, 48 VA.L. REV. 1258, 1260-61 (1962).
["It is a concrete program whereby the now only morally binding Universal Declaration of
Human Rights would be made, by the voluntary consent of the nations of the world, a legally
binding commitment .... "].
48. W. DOUGLAS, TOWARDS A GLOBAL FEDERALISM 73 (1968).
49. Cf Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1341 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (statute of limitations
provision of extradition treaty "represents an important right of the accused.")..
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in law and its institutions as the most effective and just means of polit-
ical order. Canada and all other nations which have contracted with
the United States to provide for the processing of fugitives must recog-
nize that a firm commitment to the modern development of the interna-
tional rule of law requires that a remedy be sought when domestic legal
institutions are abused and defrauded. As it now stands, the extradition




The experiences of Leonard Peltier dramatically illustrate the need
for a private remedy to redress international extradition by fraud. The
successful operation of international extradition agreements requires
good faith and fairness from sovereign states in their dealing with one
another. Breach of these accepted norms should be actionable by af-
fected individuals and sovereigns alike. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine, how-
ever, presents an out-dated barrier to just resolution of this problem.
Further study is needed to develop an appropriate remedy to correct
and deter future abuses and bad faith in the extradition process.
50. In 1982, Peltier filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1982) alleging, among other things, that certain FBI documents discovered after the trial
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), cast doubt on the veracity of
the ballistics evidence presented at trial. The petition was denied without a hearing. An
appeal from this order is now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. A brief was filed in support of Peltier's request for an evidentiary hearing by an ad
hoc committee of fifty members of the United States Congress, as amitus curiae.
